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McCALLY v. McCALLY: DIVESTITURE THROUGH
DIVORCE OF GUILTY SPOUSE'S INTEREST IN
PROPERTY PURCHASED SOLELY WITH
FUNDS OF INNOCENT SPOUSE
In McCally v. McCally,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
permitted the guilty spouse in a divorce action to take one-half of
jointly held marital property, including property bought entirely
with funds of the innocent spouse. The court recognized an ele-
ment of unjust enrichment of the guilty spouse, but nevertheless
followed the weight of authority which emphasizes historic ju-
dicial preference for predictable results concerning property rights
whenever a husband-wife relationship is severed.2 This majority
view is the result of common law technicalities concerning the
usual concurrent ownership relationships of a husband and wife,
that is, tenancy by the entireties or joint ownership. A minority
view, which at first appears to be a fairer solution to the problem,
permits the court to decide the equities of the spouses' property
holdings in each divorce case.3 When applied, the minority doc-
trine may completely divest the guilty spouse in a divorce action
of any property bought solely with funds of the innocent spouse.
Under the minority view, however, it is difficult to adopt any set
standards or ensure predictability in the law. This Note will
analyze both views to demonstrate that in their judicial application
the results of either view have been almost identical and that only
the District of Columbia strictly adheres to the minority rule.
FACTS
McCally v. McCally was a partition suit filed by the wife for
the sale of a house formerly owned by the parties as tenants by
the entireties. The parties had been married in 1953. Later, the
husband inherited a one-half interest in a District of Columbia
dwelling. He subsequently acquired the other half interest, and
the title for the house was taken in the names of husband and wife
1. 243 A.2d 538 (Md. 1968).
2. See, e.g., In re Webb, 160 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ind. 1958); Anderson
v. Anderson, 215 Md. 483, 138 A.2d 880 (1958); Barche v. Shea, 335 Mass.
367, 140 N.E.2d 305 (1957); Hosford v. Hosford, 273 App. Div. 659, 80 N.Y.S.
2d 306 (1948).
3. Schultze v. Schultze, 112 App. D.C. 162, 300 F.2d 917 (1962); Oxley
v. Oxley, 81 App. D.C. 346, 159 F.2d 10 (1946); Richardson v. Richardson,
72 App. D.C. 67, 112 F.2d 19 (1940); Moore v. Moore, 51 App. D.C. 304,
278 F. 1017 (1922).
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as tenants by the entireties. Then, according to the husband's
uncontradicted testimony, his wife "began a systematic course of
conduct to persuade and coerce him' 4 into selling the District of
Columbia property and purchasing the Maryland property which
was the subject of the suit. The husband further alleged that his
wife had threatened to leave him, for which reason he purchased
the Maryland property. The wife made no monetary contribution
towards the purchase of the property. The deed was taken out in
both names as tenants by the entireties. In a divorce action prior
to McCally the husband was awarded a decree a vinculo matrimonii
because of the wife's adultery.
The husband contended that the court should have decreed a
constructive trust in his favor for the one-half interest of the wife
since (1) the wife had used undue influence and coercion and
forced him to place the deed in both names, thus negating any
intention of a gift to the wife;' (2) the gift of property to the wife
was a conditional one, the condition being that the wife remain
"faithful, chaste and dutiful";6 and (3) public policy and the
principle of unjust enrichment should preclude the wife from re-
taining any interest in any property towards which she made no
contribution.
7
The wife contended that the divorce a vinculo matrimonii
granted by the court converted the tenancy by the entireties into
a tenancy in common. She was therefore entitled to her one-half
share in the property in question regardless of her guilt in the
divorce action.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the lower court's
decision in favor of the wife and appointed a trustee for the sale
of the property.8 The court held that ". . . the rule that a decree
a vinculo awarded one spouse because of the adultery of the other
works divestiture of the wrongdoer's interest in realty purchased
solely with funds of the innocent spouse and held in entirety, does
not apply in Maryland," notwithstanding the aspects of public
policy and unjust enrichment to the wrongdoerY
4. McCally v. McCally, 243 A.2d 538, 539.
5. McCally v. McCally, 243 A.2d 538, 540. The Court of Appeals
found that there were no material allegations which, if proven, would have
supported a finding of fraud, coercion, misrepresentation or undue in-
fluence on the part of the wife.
6. See notes 24 and 49 infra and accompanying text.
7. McCally v. McCally, 243 A.2d 538, 542. See also Note, Divorce
and Tenancy by the Entireties, 50 MASS. L.Q. 45 (1965).
8. McCally v. McCally, 243 A.2d 538, 540.
9. Id. at 542.
HUSBAND-WIFE-CONCURRENTLY HELD PROPERTY
Tenancy by the entireties is the standard common law form of
concurrent ownership of land by married couples. 10 A joint ten-
ancy is similar except that the res involved is not necessarily held
by a husband and wife.1 ' Both types of ownership involve four
unities: (1) unity of interest; (2) unity of title; (3) unity of time;
and (4) unity of possession. Joint tenants or tenants by the en-
tireties hold one and the same interest, accruing by one and the
same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held
by one and the same undivided possession. 2 On the other hand,
the only prerequisite for a tenancy in common is that the property
is held by one and the same undivided possession.
Both tenancies by the entireties and joint tenancies include
the right of survivorship. A tenancy by the entireties differs
from a joint tenancy in that tenants in entirety have no individual
interests which they can convey so as to break the unities and
defeat survivorship. However, for all practical purposes of dis-
cussion the effect of a divorce decree on property held either by
the entireties or jointly is the same since in a majority of states a
divorce automatically works a transfer to a tenancy in common.'
In a tenancy in common each of the co-tenants has a distinct and
separate interest in the property but the right to possession is com-
mon to all of the co-tenants. There is no unity of title, interest or
time. There is no right of survivorship.
14
Community property laws are in effect in eight states.15 In
these jurisdictions, unless proven otherwise, all property acquired
by a husband or wife during their marriage is assumed to be com-
10. Tenancy by the entireties is recognized in twenty-two states:
Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont,
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See 4 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 621 n.7 (1967) [hereinafter cited as POWELL].
Use of the tenancy by the entireties has slowly been falling into
disfavor. It has been repudiated as being inconsistent with modern ideas
of the relationship between husband and wife. Some jurisdictions have
eliminated it as a necessary consequence of the destruction of the spousal
unity by the married women's acts. Id. See also 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 6.6 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN
PROPERTY].
11. The historic distinction between a joint tenancy and a tenancy
by the entireties has been in the manner of holding the estate. Joint
tenants were seised of a share and of the whole-per my et per tout.
Tenants by the entireties were seised of the whole and not of a share-
per tout et non per my. In a tenancy by the entireties no conveyance
could be made without joinder of husband and wife. See 2 AMERICAN
PROPERTY § 6.1 and § 6.6.
12. See 4 POWELL § 615.
13. See note 19 infra and accompanying text.
14. See generally 2 AMERICAN PROPERTY § 6.5 and 4 POWELL § 602.
15. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas and Washington all have community property laws.
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munity property, that is, each possessing one-half. For example, if
Maryland were a community property state the deed in McCally,
being in both names, would justify a presumption of one-half
ownership by each party. At divorce, all property would be di-
vided equally. 16 California is the only community property state
claiming to adhere to the minority view.17
Therefore, the manner in which property is held, whether
jointly, by the entireties, or as community property will not vary
the presumptive disposition of property on termination of the
marriage relationship under either the majority or minority view-
points.
EFFECT OF DIVORCE ON PROPERTY HOLDINGS
Maryland and Majority View
The majority view followed in McCally has been adopted by
all but six states' and the District of Columbia. Its major premise
is that a tenancy by the entireties or a joint tenancy is converted
automatically into a tenancy in common by a divorce action. The
court stated: "It is virtually conceded that the effect of the de-
cree of divorce a vinculo was to convert the tenancy by the en-
tireties into a tenancy in common.""" The practical reason for this
result is that a tenancy by the entireties cannot be partitioned.
This is in accord with the modern trend which prefers a tenancy in
common over a joint tenancy.20 Especially in a divorce situation,
the ultimate ownership of the property should not depend on
survivorship. This would be true, however, if the property re-
mained in joint tenancy.
21
An automatic transformation has been codified in Pennsyl-
vania as follows:
Whenever any husband and wife, hereafter acquiring
16. See, e.g., Aaiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 to 25-217 (1956); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 162-164 (West 1954); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.030 (1959).
17. See notes 63-66 infra and accompanying text.
18. The exceptions to the majority noted in McCally are California,
Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan and Nebraska. The stand which
these six states and the District of Columbia supposedly take will be
referred to as the minority position.
19. Gunter v. Gunter, 187 Md. 228, 49 A.2d 454, 456 (1946). See also
Meyers v. East End Loan and Savings Ass'n., 139 Md. 607, 116 A. 453
(1922); Reed v. Reed, 109 Md. 690, 72 A. 414 (1909); Tippen v. King, 187
Misc. 150, 61 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1946); Hatcher v. Allen, 200 N.C. 407, 17 S.E.
2d 454 (1941) (a case based on almost identical facts); Humphreys v.
Humphreys, 39 Tenn. App. 99, 281 S.W.2d 270 (1954).
20. See 4 POWELL § 602.
21. Id.
property as tenants by the entireties, shall be divorced,
they shall thereafter hold such property as tenants in
common of equal one-half shares in value and either of
them may bring suit in the court of common pleas, sitting
in equity, of the county where the property is situated,
against the other to have the property sold and the pro-
ceeds divided between them.
22
This statutory provision makes the transfer a legal requirement
and is in agreement with the common law of the state.
23
The second premise of the majority view is that the husband
intended an absolute gift to the wife when he took title in both
names as tenants by the entireties. McCally quoted with approval
from Anderson v. Anderson:
2 4
The controlling fact in the instant case is that the
whole property was acquired as tenants by the entireties.
In legal effect, and in the absence of proof that it was not
her voluntary act, the transaction on its face amounted to
an absolute gift.
The mere fact that one of the spouses had paid a greater proportion
of the consideration does not eliminate the creation of a tenancy by
the entireties. The presumption of an absolute gift has been
adopted almost unanimously by the majority courts.25 The cases
indicate, however, that this presumption is not conclusive but
rather rebuttable.
20
It is important to emphasize that the McCally court found no
evidence of bad faith, fraud, coercion, misrepresentation or undue
influence. 27 The court said:
The husband's pleadings do set forth that she later
threatened to leave him unless he purchased a home for
her and the family in Montgomery County, but they do
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 501 (1965).
23. In re Holme's Estate, 414 Pa. 403, 200 A.2d 745 (1964); Miller v.
Miller, 36 Northumb. L.J. 201 (C.P. Pa. 1964).
24. 215 Md. 483, 488, 138 A.2d 880, 883 (1958). This case rested on
facts similar to McCally. A wife was trying to obtain reimbursement
for a property for which she had made a major contribution prior to
divorce.
25. See, e.g., In re Holme's Estate, 414 Pa. 403, 407, 200 A.2d 745,
747 (1964). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held:
The husband's acquisition of property with his funds and
placement of the property in the names of himself and his wife
constituted a gift and created a tenancy by the entireties even
though the husband exclusively received income therefrom dur-
ing his lifetime and the property was placed in both names with-
out his wife's knowledge or consent.
See also Reed v. Reed, 109 Md. 690, 72 A. 414 (1909); Stalcup v. Stalcup,
137 N.C. 305, 49 S.E. 210 (1904); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 917 (1955).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1964);
Perryman v. Pugh, 269 Ala. 487, 114 So. 2d 253 (1959); Fullerton v. Fuller-
ton, 233 Ark. 656, 348 S.W.2d 689 (1961); In re Putney's Will, 213 A.2d 57
(Del. Ch. 1965); Weeks v. Weeks, 72 Nev. 268, 302 P.2d 750 (1956); Dorf v.
Tuscarora Pipe Line Co., 48 N.J. Super. 26, 136 A.2d 778 (1957); Sirianni
v. Sirianni, 14 App. Div. 432, 221 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1961).
27. 243 A.2d 538, 540.
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not state that she coupled this threat with the demand
that any purchase of a new home be acquired in their
joint names as tenants by the entireties.
28
Both the majority and minority states unanimously agree that the
existence of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, coercion or bad faith
warrants the abandonment of the principle of equal distribution."
For example, if property is conveyed to spouse A in violation of
the rights of spouse B, equity will prevent spouse A from taking
by survivorship, or otherwise receiving benefits to B's disadvan-
tage, by impressing a trust on the property for B's benefit. Illus-
trative are cases where the wife is entitled to a deed in her name
alone and the conveyance is placed in both names by the husband
or where spouse A uses spouse B's money to purchase property
without consent.3 0  In these situations, a constructive trust is
imposed in order to prevent unjust enrichment. In such a case,
the wrongdoer holds the property upon a constructive trust for
the person from whom he obtained it.31 The constructive trust
theory was advanced by the husband in McCally,32 but it can be
fairly assumed that since there was no finding of the prerequisite
conditions to impose a constructive trust, the court saw no reason
to discuss the issue.
The court in McCally discounted the policy arguments set
forth by the plaintiff33 and formulated a three-pronged policy state-
ment of its own:
[T]o incorporate the doctrine of divestiture of the cul-
pable spouse . . . into the law would open a Pandora's box,
possibly affecting the stability of land titles long thought
secure, not to mention the engrafting of complications
into divorce laws already less than perfect.
34
The desire for stability in land ownership is historic, 0 and
there is a great deal to be said for minimizing any doubts of owner-
ship of land. For example, envision a husband who buys a prop-
erty and deeds it to his wife in the first year of a ten year marriage
now ending in divorce. Declaring a constructive trust of the prop-
erty would throw havoc into the law. This is especially true with
respect to the rights of the beneficiary of the constructive trust
28. Id.
29. See 2 AMERICAN PROPERTY § 6.6.
30. Annot., 25 L.R.A. 167 (1908).
31. A.W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 461-464 (1956).
32. 243 A.2d 538, 540.
33. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
34. McCally v. McCally, 243 A.2d 538, 542.
35. Two obvious examples of this policy would be the Statute of
Limitations and the Rule Against Perpetuities.
and any buyer of the land if the land was sold or conveyed prior
to the divorce. Of course, this would be more particularly the
case if the courts were willing to apply the constructive trust
doctrine to land acquired and conveyed any time during the mar-
riage, and not just that in possession at the time of the divorce.
The policy argument respecting the further complication of
the divorce laws is not well founded. Some of the minority states
have statutes which logically and fairly deal with divorce and
property rights 6 The Pandora's box argument in context relates
directly to the land title problem. As an argument per se it is not
specific enough to be arguable.
The Minority View-Does it Exist?
The minority viewpoint is recognized in varying degrees in
seven jurisdictions.3 7 The minority doctrine when strictly applied
would completely divest the guilty spouse in a divorce action of
any property which was bought solely with the innocent spouse's
funds. This would be true without the necessity of showing
any element of fraud, duress, bad faith, misrepresentation or coer-
cion since the purpose of the minority view is to prevent unjust
enrichment.
38
A comparison of statutes among states which purportedly
adhere to either the majority or minority views demonstrates that
there is little difference in their literal reading. Furthermore, close
analysis reveals that the results achieved by the "minority" view
are no different from application of the majority rule.
Connecticut, which follows the majority view, provides by
statute:
When any married person derives any estate from his
spouse in consideration of their marriage, or of love and
affection, and such spouse is granted a divorce from such
person under the laws of the state, the court which
grants the divorce, as a part of the decree, may provide
that such estate or any part thereof in the possession of
such person or standing in his name shall belong to the
spouse granted the divorce.
3 9
Minnesota, another majority state, provides:
Upon a divorce for any cause, or upon an annulment,
the court may make such disposition of the property of the
parties acquired during coverture as shall appear just and
equitable, having regard to the nature and determination
of the issue in the case, the amount of alimony or support
money, if any, awarded in the judgment, the manner by
36. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 146 (West 1954); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46-1-5(2) (1963); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910 (Supp. V. 1966); MIcH.
COMp. LAWS § 552.102 (1948). See pp. 670, 671, 672 infra.
37. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
38. See note 73 infra and accompanying text.
39. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-22a (1958).
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which said property was acquired and the persons pay-
ing or supplying the consideration therefor, the charge or
lien imposed thereon to secure payment of alimony or
support money, and all the facts and circumstances of the
case.
4 0
Both of these statutes are similar to the statute of Illinois which
is considered to follow the minority rule.
Whenever a divorce is granted, if it shall appear to the
court that either party holds the title to property equitably
belonging to the other, the court may compel conveyance
thereof to the party entitled to the same, upon such terms
as it deems equitable.
41
The Illinois statute has been extensively interpreted, and
whether it will be invoked in a particular case depends upon four
requirements. First, a divorce must be granted. 42 A divorce will
convert a tenancy by the entireties into a tenancy in common,
whereas a mere separation, whether voluntary or judicial, will
neither destroy the estate nor change the essential character of
the property holdings.43 Second, the statutory provisions may be
invoked only when a reward of alimony or property settlement on
the merits of the divorce decree could possibly be entered. There-
fore, the prime concern of the statute is not applying the equities
of the property situation but rather ensuring that the property
settlement reached by the court will be paid.44 Third, if the first
two conditions are met and if a wife made no contribution to a
property with title in the husband's name, "it is the right of the
husband to remain vested with title.145 Fourth, if, however, prop-
erty is voluntarily conveyed by husband to wife without fraud or
coercion, a gift is presumed and the wife may hold the property
against him.
46
The Illinois rule is therefore not much different from the
majority doctrine. If property is taken out in both names with
contribution having been made by only one spouse, a gift is pre-
sumed to have been made to the non-contributing spouse. The
40. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (1967). See also Wis. STAT. § 247.26
(1959) (another example of a majority state statute with very similar
wording).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 18 (1957).
42. Bateman v. Bateman, 337 Ill. App. 7, 15, 85 N.E.2d 196, 201 (1949).
43. 2 AMERICAN PROPERTY § 6.6(a). See generally Annot., 168 A.L.R.
260 (1947). See also Harrier v. Wallner, 80 Ill. 197 (1875); Cisel v. Cisel,
352 Mo. 1097, 180 S.W.2d 748 (1944); Stely v. Schreck, 128 N.Y. 263, 28 N.E.
510 (1891).
44. Cross v. Cross, 5 Ill. 2d 456, 466, 125 N.E. 2d 488, 494 (1955).
45. Bissett v. Bissett, 375 Ill. 551, 557, 31 N.E.2d 955, 957 (1941).
46. Baker v. Baker, 412 Ill. 511, 514, 107 N.E.2d 711, 713 (1952).
third requirement adds nothing to the analysis since title was
taken out in only one name; and requirements one and two note
that the statute will be invoked by the court only for the purpose
of attaching property to ensure full settlement of the divorce de-
cree.
An Illinois decision which appears at first glance to be con-
trary to McCally is Brixel v. Brixel.47 There the wife deserted
the husband without cause. She was induced to return only when
the husband executed a $1,000 judgment note to her as a gift. The
husband also wanted to sell some real estate held in both names;
but the wife refused to sign the deed unless the husband agreed
to invest the proceeds in other real property, which he did. The
wife left him and sued for divorce. The court held that the hus-
band was entitled to have the entire title to the real estate vested
in him. The court said:
If we found for the wife, such a decision would enable
the wife to consummate a fraud upon the husband. If
Appellee [wife] had continued to live with Appellant
[husband] and discharged her duties as his wife, or if it
had been judicially determined that she was compelled to
live separate or apart from him without her fault, she
might then have some standing in a court of equity to
assert her right to the judgment and the interest in real
estate.
48
This decision introduces a new element to the discussion-the idea
of a conditional gift-which is recognized in at least four of the
minority states.49 In the Brixel case, however, the court speaks of
47. 230 Ill. 441, 82 N.E. 651 (1907).
48. Id. at 453, 82 N.E. at 656.
49. See, e.g., Meldrum v. Meldrum, 15 Colo. 478, 490, 24 P. 1083,
1087 (1890), where the court said:
He [husband] was induced by false profession of love and
affection to cause the conveyance of the Denver property to be
made to her as a house for the family .... She [wife] with her
deceit and false professions of affection, held complete mastery
over him. She was false to her marital vows, and by fraud pro-
cured an unjust advantage of her husband. From such a fraud
courts of equity will grant relief, either by setting aside the
conveyance or by converting the offending party into a trustee
of the property for the benefit of the party defrauded.
Brixel v. Brixel, 230 Ill. 441, 452, 82 N.E. 651, 655 (1907) in which the court
said:
In causing the deed to be made to her jointly with himself,
there is no doubt that appellant [husband] was moved by his
desire to satisfy the unreasonable and burdensome demands made
by his wife for the purpose of trying to induce her to live with
him as his wife. Appellant was evidently very much attached to
appellee, as is shown by the sacrifices that he was willing to make
in order to induce her to live with him peaceably.
In re Lewis, 85 Mich. 340, 344, 48 N.W. 580, 581 (1891) (an unusual case
as the wife had placed her property in trust for the benefit of both the
husband and wife) where, citing Babcock v. Smith, 22 Pick. 61 (1840),
the court said:
We see no reason in holding that a husband or wife can, by a
violation of the marital obligation, obtain an interest in land which
she or he does not possess while fulfilling such obligation. The
Notes
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a fraud which really makes the Illinois result little different from
the majority view.
In the Colorado case of Meldrum v. Meldrum5" the plaintiff-
husband transferred property to his wife and sought to regain
possession after divorce. Again, the court invoked the conditional
gift theory; but the decision was also dependent upon a factual
finding of fraud and undue influence.5'
The minority courts therefore appear to really find that an
absolute gift will be construed in the absence of a finding of fraud,
coercion, bad faith, misrepresentation or undue influence. These
decisions are actually speaking constructive trust language when
any of the above five elements exist. Thus they are actually
similar in result to the majority view.
The actual similarity of the Colorado result with the majority
view is anomalous since Colorado has a statute which resembles
the minority position as conceived by McCally.
At the time of the issuance of the divorce decree, or at
some reasonable time thereafter as may be set by the
court at the time of the issuance of said divorce decree,
common law should not, and in our judgment does not, permit a
person to thus profit by his own gross wrong and a violation of
the most sacred obligation.
Dickerson v. Dickerson, 24 Neb. 530, 531, 39 N.W. 429 (1888):
Having obtained the property under the implied agreement
that the marriage relation should continue to exist, and the parties
reside together, the defendant [wife] will not be permitted to re-
tain property which she acquired from her husband by deceit
and imposition.
Note either the expressed or implied presence of either fraud, coercion,
undue influence or deceit in these cases, all of which are, therefore, in-
correctly cited by the courts as adhering to the minority doctrine.
50. 15 Colo. 478, 24 P. 1083 (1890).
51. Id. at 478, 24 P. at 1083. The court said:
The relation of husband and wife is one of special confi-
dence and trust, requiring the utmost good faith and frankness in
their dealings with each other; and where either one is false
to the other, and fraudulently or through coercion procures an
unjust advantage, Chancery may relieve against the transaction.
Where the wife, while harboring a determination to abandon
her husband and dissolve the marital relation, fraudulently pro-
cures from him valuable property as a home for the family, and
afterwards institutes proceedings for a divorce, equity may re-
store the title to the husband after a decree of divorce has
been granted.
Id. See also Stone v. Wood, 85 Ill. 603 (1877) in which the court stated;
Where either the husband or wife becomes untrue to the other,
and by fraud obtains an unjust advantage over the other, a court
of equity will readily afford relief as it will between other persons
not occupying the relationship.
Id. at 609.
52. McCally v. McCally, 243 A.2d 538, 540. See also note 12 supra
and accompanying text.
on application of either party, the court may make such
orders, if any, as the circumstances of the case may war-
rant relative to division of property, in such proportions as
may be fair and equitable.5"
This statute can be interpreted to allow the court to divest a
non-contributing, guilty spouse in a divorce action; but again the
courts have been reluctant to invoke a literal reading except when
the guilty spouse (1) had intentions of separation or divorce at the
time the property was purchased; and (2) as a means of awarding
property based on the merits of the divorce decree rather than on
the basis of financial contribution to the property purchased.
5 4
Michigan similarly has a statute which applies to realty
owned jointly or by the entireties and also to situations where a
divorce decree is issued without any determination of property
ownership.
Every husband and wife owning real estate as joint
tenants or as tenants by the entireties shall, upon being
divorced, become tenants in common of such real estate,
unless the ownership thereof is otherwise determined by
the decree of divorce."5
In Witschi v. Witschi56 the court said: "This section [of the stat-
ute] is solely for the purpose of providing for the disposition of
entirety property when a decree divorcing the owner omits to
award such property." In Allen v. Allen17 the Michigan court
held:
An award under this section must be equitable in the
light of the facts and circumstances surrounding each case
. . . and where there is neither allegation nor proof of wife's
adultery and property held by the entireties was all that
was owned by either spouse, a decree giving it to the hus-
band is inequitable. ... r3
This case gives full expression to the equitable nature of the minor-
ity doctrine. It differs from the McCally case, however, in that it
doesn't speak of contribution, and further, the court saw no need
to apply the equitable principles which it expresses since in the
divorce action there was no guilt element on the part of either
spouse.
Georgia was also cited as a minority jurisdiction in McCally.59
In Evans v. Evans60 the wife had already committed adultery
53. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-5(2) (1963).
54. Green v. Green, 139 Colo. 551, 342 P.2d 659 (1959); Drake v.
Drake, 138 Colo. 388, 333 P.2d 1038 (1959); Nunemacher v. Nunemacher,
132 Colo. 300, 287 P.2d 662 (1955).
55. M IicH. COMP. LAWS § 552.102 (1948) (emphasis added).
56. 261 Mich. 334, 337, 246 N.W. 139, 140 (1933).
57. 196 Mich. 292, 162 N.W. 987 (1917).
53. Id. at 296, 162 N.W. at 988. See also Lukshaitis v. Lukshaitis,
314 Mich. 426, 22 N.W.2d 825 (1946).
59. 243 A.2d 538, 541.
60. 118 Ga. 890, 45 S.E. 612 (1903).
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when the husband made a gift of property to her. The court gave
the property entirely to the husband after divorce. The court indi-
cated that the result would be the same if at the time of obtaining
the gift the wife has in contemplation a subsequent adultery or
elopement. Once more, the underlying reason behind the court's
decision was the wife's fraud. However, the court by dicta speaks
of adultery alone without any contemplation of divorce or separ-
ation on the wife's part.
Adultery is the most serious of marital offenses; that
it poisons the marriage relation . . . that, as it would be
insulting and indecent to incorporate in a deed a gift pro-
vision making it void if the wife should be guilty of that
crime, the husband must be supposed to have given, and
the wife to have accepted, with the implied condition that
the property should not be used for the support of the
paramour, or for the maintenance of one who had not
only violated the vows under which he had promised to
endow her with his worldly goods, but had outraged him as
a man, and repudiated him as a husband; that the real
condition of such a conveyance was the marriage and the
continuation of the married state.6 1
Here is an excellent minority policy argument. It is broader than
the conditional gift concept.6 2 However, as stated, the facts of the
case do not allow a pure application of the minority doctrine, and
there has been no such application in Georgia.
A California statute implies that under certain circumstances
the minority doctrine can be applied to its fullest extent.
One: If the [divorce] decree is rendered on the
ground of adultery, incurable insanity or extreme cruelty,
the community property shall be assigned to the respective
parties in such proportions as the court, from all the facts
of the case, and the conditions of the party may deem just.
Two: If the decree be rendered on any other ground
than that of adultery, incurable insanity or extreme
cruelty, the community property shall be equally divided
between the parties. 3
Thus, upon grounds of adultery, incurable insanity and extreme
cruelty the court is given a great deal of discretion. Yet, the courts
have been reluctant to exercise this discretion. In Morris v. Ber-
man64 the California court spoke of the equities of the situation
but based its holding on undue influence. In Schotte v. Schotte 5
61. Id. at 892, 45 S.E. at 613.
62. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
63. CAL. CIV. CODE § 146 (West 1954).
64. 159 Cal. App. 2d 770, 324 P.2d 601 (1958).
65. 203 Cal. App. 2d 28, 21 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1962).
a husband had advanced money to his wife to build rental units
on the wife's property. In return she promised to give him a deed
in joint tenancy to the property. The court enforced the wife's
agreement by a constructive trust of the property in favor of the
husband because the "break of her oral promise constitutes a
violation of the confidential relationship between them."6
The question may therefore be properly posed as to whether
there is really a split of authority as McCally indicated. Califor-
nia, Colorado, Georgia and Michigan have statutes by which they
could completely divest a non-contributing guilty spouse in a di-
vorce action of any interest held in joint property. But those
courts have refused to apply their statutes except in situations
involving fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, undue influence or
bad faith.
The District of Columbia is the only jurisdiction adhering to
the concepts of the minority position. Its statute is comparable
to others previously discussed.
Upon the entry of a final decree of annulment or
absolute divorce, in the absence of a valid ante-nuptial
agreement or post-nuptial agreement in relation thereto,
all property rights of the parties in joint tenancy or
tenancy by the entirety shall stand dissolved and, in the
same proceeding in which the decree is entered, the court
may award the property to the one lawfully entitled
thereto or apportion it in such a manner as seems equi-
table, just and reasonable.
67
The judicial application of the statute distinguishes the District of
Columbia view. The courts there have been willing to grant the
innocent-contributing spouse the entire property, even when there
is no fraud, coercion or undue influence.68 But a close reading of
the statute indicates that application of the statute is mandatory
unless there is a valid agreement to the contrary. 9 The statute
authorizes the court to settle the partners' marital status and rights
to property in one proceeding. 70 If a husband furnishes all the
consideration, the inclusion of the wife in a joint deed is supported
by no consideration except her faithful observance of the marriage
vows. Of course, this faithful observance has ceased if the wife is
judged the guilty party in a divorce case.71 The division of jointly
held property is left to the sound judgment' of the trial court. In
addition, judicial interpretations of the statute have noted the
66. Id. at 223. Accord Brison v. Brison, 75 Cal. 525, 17 P. 689 (1888).
67. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910 (Supp. V. 1966).
68. Moore v. Moore, 51 App. D.C. 304, 278 F. 1017 (1922).
69. Leibel v. Leibel, 190 A.2d 821 (D.C. App. 1963); Hipp v. Hipp,
191 F. Supp. 299 (1960), aff'd, 111 App. D.C. 307, 296 F.2d 429 (1961).
70. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 88 App. D.C. 193, 188 F.2d 31 (1951).
71. See, e.g., Schultze v. Schultze, 112 App. D.C. 162, 300 F.2d 917
(1962); Oxley v. Oxley, 81 App. D.C. 346, 154 F.2d 10 (1946); Richards v.
Richards, 72 App. D.C. 67, 112 F.2d 19 (1940).
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implied presence of the conditional gift concept. 2
The minority position is aimed at the prevention of unjust
enrichment. Courts should take note of the background facts of
a divorce case and distribute property in accordance with rules of
fair play. A divorce should not be used as a weapon to gain a
financial windfall.73 The days are past when the divorced woman
was unable to go out on her own and make a living for herself.
Equity is not to be equated with chivalry.
ALTERNATE BASES FOR THE McCALLY DECREE
The McCally court may have had more authority to support
its opinion than it realized. The "wrongdoer" in even the minor-
ity states is almost always guilty of fraud, coercion, undue influ-
ence, misrepresentation or bad faith. In cases involving an adultery
or desertion situation which occurs years after the gift of property
and without any evidence of fraudulent element, even the minor-
ity courts have been unwilling to invoke the statutory discretion
allowed them.
As a practical matter, it is hard to prove fraudulent intent on
the wife's part at the time of the transfer of property. The
court cannot prove a subjective state of mind without reference to
objective evidence or standards. The main difference between
the two views set forth in McCally is probably the extent to which
various courts have gone to find fraud. In McCally the court
said that no material issue of fact was raised. Therefore, it accepted
the husband's contentions.74 Yet it was unable to find any fraud.
7 5
Certainly, at least coercion or undue influence was present in the
wife's actions to force the husband to move from the District of
Columbia to Maryland. This same coercion could have been in-
ferred to have been present to influence the husband to place the
deed in both names.
An aid in ascertaining whether the guilty spouse had any
fraudulent intent at the time of a property transfer would be in
the establishment of a rebuttable presumption that such intent
existed if the divorce takes place within a specified number of
years after the property transfer. However, just as it is difficult
to prove the subjective state of mind in proving fraud, it may be
72. Lundregan v. Lundregan, 176 A.2d 790 (D.C. Mun. App. 1962).
73. See Note, Divorce and Tenancy by the Entireties, 50 MASS. L.Q.
45 (1965).
74. See notes 5, 7, 24 and 49 supra and accompanying text.
75. McCally v. McCally, 243 A.2d 538, 540.
just as difficult and unfair to ask a party to disprove the pre-
sumption.
CONCLUSION
McCally considered whether an innocent spouse in a divorce
action has the right to have the guilty spouse completely divested
of his one-half interest in joint property. The McCally expression
as to the existence of majority and minority viewpoints is correct
upon a reading of relevant statutes. However, there is only one
jurisdiction, the District of Columbia, which strictly adheres to the
minority doctrine. Statutes of representative jurisdictions dealing
with the disposition of real property at the time of divorce, could
all be interpreted as permitting their courts to apply the minority
doctrine of equitable distribution of the property based on the two
factors of (1) guilt in the divorce proceeding and (2) contribution
at the time of the property purchase. Yet, the majority courts
adhere to the common law rule of one-half distribution to each
spouse except where either bad faith, misrepresentation, fraud,
duress or undue influence exists. And, similarly, where the courts
in jurisdictions termed by McCally as "minority" contend ob-
servance of another rule, one of the five fraudulent elements is
always present.
The District of Columbia has been the most liberal in applying
purely equitable principles to the facts. And it is not the District
of Columbia's statutory law that is unique, but rather the appli-
cation and interpretation of that statutory law by its courts.
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